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SEAMAN’S MANSLAUGHTER AND CHARTER 
BOATS – THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. 






Captain Richard Smith was sailing his charter vessel, Cimarron, along 
with a crew from Camden, Maine to St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands for 
the winter season. During the voyage, Smith stopped in Beaufort, North 
Carolina, and picked up David Pontious who would join the crew for 
the remainder of the journey. Shortly after joining the crew, Pontious 
began experiencing hallucinations and sickness, culminating in 
Pontious attacking Smith. After the altercation was broken up, Pontious 
jumped overboard and drowned. Smith never made an attempt to assist 
Pontious and waited until the next day to radio for assistance. Upon the 
Cimarron’s arrival in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Smith was arrested and 
charged under a rarely used statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1115, commonly 
known as Seaman’s Manslaughter.  After a trial, Smith’s attorney filed 
a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the statute only applies 
to commercial vessels. Over the Government’s objection, the motion 
was granted. Applying two cannons of statutory interpretation, ejusdem 
generis and noscitur a sociis, Smith contended that in order to be 
convicted under § 1115, the vessel needed to be engaged in commercial 
activity. This includes carrying passengers or cargo for pay. 
Accordingly, because the Cimarron, was not being paid to transport 
any passengers or cargo, and no members of the crew were being paid, 
the Court accepted Smith’s argument that the Cimarron was not 
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When charter boat captain Richard Smith began his annual 
voyage from Camden, Maine to St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands in the 
fall of 2015, nothing seemed out of the ordinary.2 Smith had made 
this voyage to St. John every year since 2005 where he operated a 
charter boat business during the winter months.3 On October 22, 
2015, Smith docked his vessel, the S/V Cimarron, in Beaufort, 
North Carolina where David Pontious joined Smith’s crew – 
replacing a crew member.4 Shortly after joining the crew of the 
Cimarron, Pontious became “seasick and dehydrated,” and began 
hallucinating.5 In particular, the other crewmembers reported that 
Pontious believed he had been drugged and kidnapped by the crew 
of the Cimarron.6 The next day, Pontious reportedly began to hear 
voices.7 
 
On October 25, the Cimarron was approximately 300 miles 
off shore and Pontious’ condition had deteriorated substantially.8 In 
an apparent attempt to take control of the Cimarron, Pontious 
allegedly attacked Smith, choking the captain.9 After other crew 
members intervened in this attack on Smith, Pontious allegedly 
 
2 Lauren Abbate, Captain of Camden Charter Vessel Charged with Seaman’s 




3 Eric Russell, Prosecution Lays Out Case Against Camden Charter Boat 




4 Indictment, United States v. Richard Smith, No. 3:18-CR-00026-CVG-RM (D. 
V.I. Jul. 12, 2018), Doc. No. 1; see also Russell, supra note 2. 
5 Indictment, United States v. Richard Smith, No. 3:18-CR-00026-CVG-RM (D. 
V.I. Jul. 12, 2018), Doc. No. 1. 
6 Abbate, supra note 1.  
7  Id.  
8 Id.  
9 Eric Russell, Camden Charter Boat Captain Acquitted in Unusual 
Manslaughter Case, Portland Press Herald, (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01/09/camden-charter-boat-acquitted-in-
seamans-manslaughter-case/, [https://perma.cc/28KJ-UVJM]. 
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jumped overboard, struck his head on the railing of the Cimarron, 
and never surfaced.10 It is undisputed that Smith did not make 
contact with authorities to report the incident until the next day, 
although Smith maintains that he had attempted to make contact 
with the United States Coast Guard, but only got static.11 Upon the 
Cimarron’s arrival in St. John on November 2, 2015, Smith was 
arrested and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1115, a criminal 
statute which prohibits what has become to be known as “Seaman’s 
Manslaughter.”12 
 
After the third day of the jury trial in the U.S. District Court 
for the Virgin Islands, Smith’s attorneys moved for a judgment of 
acquittal before the case was submitted to the jury for 
deliberations.13 The Defendant’s motion put forth three arguments: 
first, the defense argued that the October voyage was not a 
“commercial voyage,” and therefore Smith could not be convicted 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1115;14 second, the motion contended there was 
insufficient evidence presented that Smith was the direct cause of 
Pontious’ death; 15 and finally, the defense argued that Smith did not 
owe a duty of care to Pontious after Pontious attempted a mutiny.16 
The District Court granted Smith’s motion, and Smith was acquitted 
of Seaman’s Manslaughter in the death of David Pontious.17 
 
The focus of this case note will be on the first argument 
presented in Smith’s motion for judgment of acquittal – whether or 
not the voyage in October 2015 was, in fact, a commercial voyage 
such that Smith cannot be guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1115. In 
particular, this Note contends that, despite a strong policy argument 
to the contrary, the trial judge correctly decided the issue of whether 
the October voyage constituted a “commercial voyage” within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1115. 
 
10 Id.  
11 Abbate, supra note 1. 
12 Russell, supra note 8. 
13 Def.’s Mot. J. Acquittal, United States v. Richard Smith, No. 3:18-CR-00026-
CVG-RM (D. V.I. Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Def. Mot.]. 
14 Id. at 3.  
15 Id. at 8. 
16Id. at 10.  
17 Russell, supra note 8. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE SEAMAN’S MANSLAUGHTER LAWS 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1115 has undergone several changes since its 
first version was implemented in 1838, primarily dealing with the 
breadth of jurisdiction of the statute. The first iteration of 
section1115 came into existence in 1838.18 Initially, the early 
version of § 1115 appeared in the comprehensive “Act of July 17” 
and was entitled “An Act to Provide for the Better Security of the 
Lives of Passengers on Board Vessels Propelled in Whole or in Part 
by Steam.”19 The Act was a direct response to the increasing number 
of deaths that were occurring aboard steamships and “provided for 
the prosecution of officers or crewmen whose negligence caused the 
death of any person aboard their vessel.”20 
 
Following the passage of the 1838 Act, Congress enacted an 
independent statute in 1871 to promote the safety and “security of 
Life” aboard steamships.21 Of note, Section 57 of the Act of 1871 
provided a mechanism for addressing the loss of life as a result of 
the negligence of a person employed on a steamship.22 In 1874, 
Congress codified Section 57 of the Act as section 5344 in the 
Revised Statutes of 1874, and moved it to a chapter “concerning 
crimes occurring within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.”23 Interestingly, unlike other statutes in the same 
chapter, such as those prohibiting murder, Section 5344 did not 
contain an express prohibition of “federal jurisdiction over 
 
18 United States v. Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 1979); see 
also Allison Fish, The Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1115 to Offshore 
Drilling Disasters: A Requiem for the Seaman's Manslaughter Act, 39 TUL. 
MAR. L.J. 241, 242 (2014) [hereinafter Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S 
1115 to Offshore Drilling Disasters]. 
19 United States v. Holmes, 104 F. 884, 885 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1900).  
20 Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d at 614 (citing Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 2, 
5 Stat. 304); see also Fish, Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S 1115 to Offshore 
Drilling Disasters at 242 (noting that there were more than two thousand deaths 
aboard steamboats prior to the passage of the Act of July 7). 
21 Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d at 614.  
22 Id.  
23 Fish, Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S 1115 to Offshore Drilling Disasters 
at 243. 
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violations occurring on waters within the jurisdiction of any state.”24 
This may be evidence of Congress’ intent to have a broad statute 
covering incidents arising anywhere “within the general admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction.”25 
 
The reach of section 5344 was substantially limited in 1909 
with the statute’s codification in Section 282 of the Criminal Code, 
which made the statute “subject to the definition of the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction.”26 Therefore, “the law no 
longer applied to homicides committed on waters within the 
territorial jurisdiction of any state.”27 This jurisdictional restriction 
remained in place during the recodification of the criminal code in 
1926, but was removed in 1948.28 In 1948, the modern version of 
the Seaman’s Manslaughter Act was codified as a statute of general 
application as 18 U.S.C. § 1115. 
 
In its current version, 18 U.S.C. § 1115 reads, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
 
Every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on 
any steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence, 
or inattention to his duties on such vessel the life of any 
person is destroyed, and every owner, charterer, inspector, 
or other public officer, through whose fraud, neglect, 
connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the life of any 
person is destroyed, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.29 
 
Of note, “[u]nlike the common law definition of 
manslaughter and the companion statutory definition for general 
manslaughter . . . Section 1115 only requires the proof of any degree 
of negligence to meet the culpability threshold.”30 This lower 
 
24 Allied Towing Corp, 602 F.2d at 614.  
25 Fish, Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S 1115 to Offshore Drilling Disasters 
at 243. 
26 Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d at 615.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2016). 
30 United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 657 (5th Cir. 2015).  
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threshold for culpability was used by Smith’s attorneys to argue that 
the applicability of section 1115 should be limited to commercial 
vessels.31 
 
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
 
Courts addressing the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1115 have 
been clear that the text of the statute is ambiguous.32 The language 
of a statute is considered ambiguous when it is “susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation or more than one accepted 
meaning.”33 To determine the meaning of ambiguous language in 
the context of section 1115,  courts have typically invoked two 
canons of interpretation: ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis.34 
 
Ejusdem generis is used when “general words follow an 
enumeration of specific terms.”35 In this situation, “the general 
words are read to apply only to other items like those specifically 
enumerated.”36 It is important to note that these canons are limited, 
however. Specifically, “the rule[s] cannot be used to ‘obscure and 
defeat the intent and purpose of Congress’ or ‘render general words 
meaningless.’”37 Furthermore, “[t]he limiting principle of ejusdem 
generis has particular force with respect to criminal statutes, which 
courts are compelled to construe rigorously in order to protect 
unsuspecting citizens from being ensnared by ambiguous statutory 
language.”38 Of particular importance in Smith is whether the term 
“captain” in section 1115 is limited to a captain employed on a 
commercial vessel.39 Without this reading, the word “captain” may 
 
31 Def. Mot. at 7.  
32 Kaluza, 780 F.Supp. at 658.  
33 Id.  
34 Id. (using the canons to assess whether an offshore oil rig constitutes a 
“vessel” which is covered under 18 U.S.C. § 1115); United States v. LaBrecque, 
419 F.Supp. 430, 434 (D. N.J. 1976) (invoking the canons when addressing the 
question of whether the captain of a pleasure vessel may be charged under 18 
U.S.C. § 1115). 
35 Kaluza, 780 F.Supp. at 660–661 (internal quotation omitted). 
36 Id. at 661 (internal quotation omitted).  
37 Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142. 163 
(2012). 
38 Id. (quoting United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974)).  
39 Def. Mot. at 3. 
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be applicable to all vessels, not just commercial vessels, and Smith 
could be held liable.40 
 
The other canon, noscitur a sociis, “is employed to ascertain 
the meaning of an ambiguous or doubtful word.”41 To obtain the 
meaning of the “ambiguous or doubtful word,” that word must be 
read with “reference to other words with which it is associated.”42 
Simply put, noscitur a sociis requires ambiguous words to be 
viewed in light of the other words associated with it. 
 
To illustrate, in the case of Smith, the canon of ejusdem 
generis is used to determine if the words in the phrase “[e]very 
captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any steamboat 
or vessel” in section 1115 are read individually or as a list. In other 
words, whether the word “captain” is read on its own, or in 
conjunction with “other person employed on any steamboat or 
vessel.” If “captain” is read on its own, any captain – whether 
employed on a commercial vessel or not – would be liable under § 
1115. However, if read in conjunction with the other words in the 
list, as noscitur a sociis demands, then only those captains employed 
on commercial vessels would be subject to punishment under 
section 1115. 
 
IV. UNITED STATES V. LABRECQUE 
 
Relying principally on United States v. LaBrecque, Smith’s 
counsel argued that the vessel could not meet the definition of a 
“commercial vessel” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1115 because 
of the absence of paying passengers or cargo on the Cimarron and 
the lack of evidence that Smith was “employed” as a captain on the 
Cimarron.43 The facts of LaBrecque are remarkably similar to those 
of the Smith case. 
 
In LaBrecque, the defendant, Cyril LaBrecque, was the 
owner of a sailing schooner, the Saddie and Edgar. LaBrecque, 
 
40 See generally, LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434. 
41 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434. 
42 Id.  
43 Def. Mot. at 7. 
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along with his wife Jessie, had planned a voyage to sail the Sadie 
and Edgar from Connecticut to Florida.44 Accompanying the 
LaBrecques on their voyage were the first mate, the LaBrecque’s 
Labrador retriever, and three recent high school graduates, Michael 
Riker, Paul Sagarino, and Bradford Blakely, who comprised the 
Sadie and Edgar’s crew.45 Similar to the crewmembers in Smith, 
Riker, Sagarino, and Blakely were onboard the vessel as crew but 
were not paid for their services.46 Only a relatively small part of the 
voyage in LaBrecque, the stretch from Sandy Hook, Connecticut to 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, was to take place on the ocean.47 
 
Once the Sadie and Edgar was on the ocean, it encountered 
inclement weather and began to take on water.48 Eventually, the 
crew found themselves in the water and only a small skiff was 
available for all five people as well as the Labrador.49 Sagarino and 
Blakely were forced to stay in the cold water alongside the skiff for 
approximately twelve hours while the LaBrecques, Riker, and the 
Labrador were in the skiff.50 Sagarino and Blakely died.51 
 
Cyril LaBrecque was ultimately charged with one count of 
Seaman’s Manslaughter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1115.52 Like 
defense counsel in Smith, LaBrecque’s attorneys filed a motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the grounds that section 1115 only applies 
to commercial vessels; and, since there were no paying passengers 
or cargo aboard the Sadie and Edgar, section 1115 is inapplicable.53 
The LaBrecque Court granted the motion.54 Given the similarities in 
factual circumstances between Smith and LaBrecque as well as 
Smith’s reliance on the reasoning presented in LaBrecque, the 
Court’s reasoning in LaBrecque bears repeating. 
 
44 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 432. 
45 Id. at 431.  
46 Id. at 434. 
47 Id. at 432.  
48 Id. at 433. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 431. 
53 Id. at 434.  
54 Id. at 439.  
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LaBrecque’s primary contention was identical to Smith’s: 
“the word ‘captain’ must be interpreted with reference to the words 
‘other person employed.’”55 This reading of “captain,” according to 
LaBrecque, required a finding that section 1115 only applies to 
“vessels engaged in commercial activity.”56 To assess the validity of 
LaBrecque’s argument, the Court turned to ejusdem generis and 
noscitur a sociis.57 Based off of the construction of the phrase in 
question, as well as the relevant legislative history, the Court in 
LaBrecque determined that the word “captain” only applies to 
captains employed on commercial vessels or engaged in commercial 
activity and, therefore, granted LaBrecque’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal.58 
 
V. HOOPENGARNER V. UNITED STATES 
 
Although the majority of cases dealing with the issue have 
concluded that only vessels engaged in commercial activity are 
covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1115,59 the 1959 case of Hoopengarner 
came to a different conclusion.60 Hoopengarner presents a stark 
contrast to LaBrecque and may present an alternative to the use of 
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis for courts deciding issues of 
applicability for section1115. 
 
In Hoopengarner, a cabin cruiser with several individuals 
onboard was on a fishing trip on Lake St. Clair off the coast of 
Michigan.61 Benjamin Hoopengarner, the defendant, was also 
boating in his speedboat.62 At approximately 9:00 PM, 
Hoopengarner’s speedboat collided with the cabin cruiser and 
several individuals were thrown from their vessels – including Mr. 
 
55 Id. at 434; see also Def. Mot. at 6.   
56 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434.  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Def.’s Mot. at 6 (citing United States v. O’Keefe, 426 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Shroder, 2006 WL 1663663 at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 12, 
2006).  
60 Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959).  
61 Hoopengarner, 270 F.2d at 467.  
62 Id.  
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Hoopengarner.63 Shortly after the collision, other boats on Lake St. 
Clair made their way toward the site of the collision and attempted 
to rescue the people thrown into the water.64 Unfortunately, 
however, Virginia Ward was struck by a boat coming to her rescue 
and was killed.65 Hoopengarner was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1115 
for her death and he was found guilty in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.66 Hoopengarner 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit.67 
 
Hoopengarner raised five issues on appeal: first, the federal 
charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment because he had already been tried by a state court;68 
second, “the Constitution, as well as the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, required dismissal of the indictment;”69 third, lack of 
jurisdiction by the District Court; fourth, that his conduct “was not 
the proximate cause of the death of Virginia Ward;”70 and finally, 
that the District Court “abused its discretion by failing to suspend 
the sentence.”71 The third issue raised on appeal is the only issue 
that presents the potential to support the Government’s argument in 
Smith’s case. 
 
Interestingly, Hoopengarner never explicitly raised the 
argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1115 only applies to commercial 
vessels.72 However, in addressing the jurisdictional issue raised by 
Hoopengarner, the Court concluded that because the vessel was 
“registered, licensed, and enrolled under the laws of the United 
States,”73 courts had jurisdiction to enforce criminal penalties 
against those operating vessels – regardless of whether the vessel 
was commercial or not.74 
 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 468.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 467.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 See generally, id.  
73 Id. at 471.  
74 Id.  
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Hoopengarner, therefore, greatly expanded the scope of 18 
U.S.C. § 1115, even if it did so inadvertently. Nevertheless, 
Hoopengarner’s conviction was upheld and remains the only 
prosecution to be “leveled regarding a non-commercial voyage.”75 
Although Hoopengarner did uphold the conviction of Benjamin 
Hoopengarner under section 1115, the Hoopengarner Court was not 
presented with, and thus did not make any determinations regarding, 
the issue of the commercial status of Hoopengarner’s vessel. Rather, 
it did so on grounds other than vessel status and thus does not 
squarely address the issue set forth in LaBrecque and Smith. 
 
In sum, Hoopengarner is the sole case to sustain a conviction 
of an individual not engaged in commercial activity under section 
1115.76 However, because Hoopengarner did not specifically 
address the issue raised in LaBrecque and Smith, its support as a 
counterargument is minimal.77 In fact, in LaBrecque, the Court 
noted that “[w]hile Hoopengarner implicitly sanctioned the 
prosecution of a pleasure boat owner, it seems to represent an 
unwarranted (and perhaps unintentional) extension of the statute to 
cover a type of situation not intended by Congress.”78 
 
VI. APPLICATION TO UNITED STATES V. RICHARD SMITH 
 
The facts of the case against Richard Smith are not in 
dispute. Richard Smith’s vessel, the Cimarron, was not engaged in 
commercial activity for the purposes of section1115 because it was 
not “carrying passengers or cargo for pay.”79 Pontious was merely 
receiving free passage aboard the Cimarron.80 Furthermore, as the 
defense alleged, “there was no evidence to show that Smith was 
‘employed’ as a captain on the Cimarron at the time of the 
incident.”81 
 
75 Def.’s Mot. at 6, n. 1.  
76 Def.’s Mot. at 6, n. 1. 
77 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 435.  
78 Id.  
79 Def.’s Mot. at 7. 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
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Additionally, an important factual point to note is that the 
government’s expert at trial admitted during his testimony “that the 
Cimarron was not a commercial vessel at the time Pontious jumped 
overboard.”82 This admission from the government’s expert 
undoubtedly had a substantial negative impact on the government’s 
case. The testimony of the government’s expert and the Defense’s 
argument lead to the conclusion that the commercial status of the 
vessel may change depending on the presence of paying passengers 
or cargo.83 In other words, if Pontious had paid to be aboard the 
Cimarron, with all other facts being the same, section 1115 would 
likely apply.84 Against this backdrop, the canons of statutory 
construction outlined above are necessary to determine if, in fact, 
section 1115 only applies to commercial vessels.85 If the answer is 
“yes,” then the District Court reached the correct conclusion in 
granting the Defense’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal – in spite 
of strong policy arguments to the contrary. 
 
The issue still remains, however, whether or not section 
1115 applies solely to commercial vessels. Based on the multiple 
interpretations of the statute that are present, it is clear, as other 
courts who have addressed the issue have mentioned, that the statute 
is ambiguous when it comes to the application of section1115 to 
noncommercial vessels.86 Thus, utilizing ejusdem generis and 
noscitur a sociis are necessary. 
 
In the case of section 1115, the words “captain,” “engineer,” 
and “pilots” are the specific terms and “other persons employed on 
any steamboat or vessel” are the general terms.87 Using ejusdem 
generis, the term captain, a specific term, is limited by the general 
terms, “other persons employed on a vessel.” At this point, noscitur 
a sociis can be invoked to ascertain the meaning of the term 
“captain” with reference to the “other words with which it is 
 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Kaluza, 780 F.Supp. at 658. 
86 See, e.g., Kaluza, 780 F.Supp.; LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. 
87 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434; see also Fish, supra note 17, at 243. 
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associated, here ‘other persons employed.’”88 Based on the context 
within which the term “captain” appears in section 1115, as well as 
the statutory history of section 1115, it is clear that the term 
“captain” is limited to those “employed” on vessels or steamboats. 
In fact, an argument could be made that based on legislative intent 
alone, section 1115 is limited in application to commercial vessels. 
As noted in Section I, supra, Congress enacted the earliest iteration 
of section 1115 in direct response to a rise in deaths aboard 
commercial steamboats. This history, taken in conjunction with the 
canons of interpretation of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, 
presents a compelling argument that section 1115 should be limited 
in its application to captains engaged in commercial activity. 
 
Based on these principles, the District Court reached the 
correct legal conclusion when it granted the Defendant’s Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal. At the time that Pontious died, the Cimarron 
was not carrying any passengers or cargo for pay, nor was Smith 
being paid to perform his duties as captain.89 Thus, the District Court 
had no other viable alternative than to grant the Defendant’s Motion. 
 
VII. EXPANSION OF § 1115 TO NONCOMMERCIAL VESSELS 
 
Based on the aforementioned principles and legislative 
history, the Court in Smith reached the correct conclusion – 
application of section 1115 is limited to vessels engaged in 
commercial activity. The question then becomes: should it be? 
Regardless of the interpretation of an ambiguous statute, the real-
world consequences of not being able to hold captains of 
noncommercial vessels criminally liable for their negligence thrusts 
an important policy question to the forefront of the Smith case. There 
are two specific questions related to this. First, whether section 1115 
may apply when a vessel has been, or will be, used for commercial 
purposes, even if not engaged in commercial activity at the time of 
an individual’s death. Second, whether there is a need for 
Congressional action to expand the reach of section 1115 to 
expressly include noncommercial vessels. 
 
88 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434 (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 
303, 307 (1961)). 
89 Def.’s Mot. at 7. 
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It is uncontroverted that David Pontious became ill and 
eventually attacked Richard Smith.90 However, it is equally clear 
that when Pontious jumped overboard into the Atlantic Ocean, 
Richard Smith kept sailing the Cimarron to the Virgin Islands and 
made no attempt to locate Pontious or render effective assistance.91 
This conduct falls beneath the standard set by the manslaughter 
statute, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1112,92 and thus left prosecutors one 
option for holding Smith criminally liable for the death of David 
Pontious: Seaman’s Manslaughter.93 Additionally, “the judge’s 
ruling is not subject to appeal and the statute of limitations for a civil 
lawsuit has expired.”94 
 
Based on the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 
the significant question is whether the individual was engaged in 
commercial activity at the time that the individual died as a result of 
another’s negligence.95 It has been argued that the lower standard of 
negligence required for conviction under section1115 is evidence 
that the statute should only apply to a limited category of vessels 
and individuals, namely those engaged in commercial activity at the 
 
90 Eric Russell, Prosecution Lays Out Case Against Camden Charter Boat 




91 Id.  
92 The statute provides:  
Manslaughter is the killing of a human being without malice. It is of 
two kinds: Voluntary – upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 
Involuntary – In the commission of an unlawful act not amount to a 
felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due 
caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.  
 
93 “Section 1115 requires a lower degree of negligence to be proven to sustain a 
conviction than its sister statute Title 18 USC § 1112 which incorporated 
elements of common law manslaughter.” Philip H. Hilder & Paul L. Creech, 
Seaman’s Manslaughter: The Criminalization of Death by Negligence, 3, 
https://www.hilderlaw.com/Publications/ (last visited April 13, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/R5KY-WBNZ].  
94 Russell, supra note 8. 
95 Def.’s Mot. at 7. 
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time of an individual’s death.96 Accordingly, if the government 
wants to prosecute a captain of a noncommercial vessel for 
manslaughter, it would be required to meet the higher standard set 
forth by section 1112.97 
 
The issue presented by Smith is that the Cimarron would 
likely qualify as a commercial vessel in other contexts. For example, 
if Smith had been hired by an individual as a charter captain, the 
Cimarron would undoubtedly be acting as a commercial vessel and 
section 1115 would apply. The Cimarron is not a traditional 
“noncommercial” vessel because it was not used for Smith’s 
pleasure.98 Rather, Smith used the Cimarron for commercial 
purposes by getting paid to transport passengers—he just was not 
doing so at the time of Pontious’ death.99 Simply put, the gap 
between sections 1112 and 1115 effectively leave certain “off-duty” 
commercial vessels immune from criminal liability. And, in this 
case, there were also no civil repercussions for Smith because 
Pontious’ family did not bring a civil suit within the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
 
Although prosecutions under section 1115 are on the rise,100 
cases like Smith present a compelling reason for the expansion of 
section 1115. The limited application of section 1115 to commercial 
vessels stems in part from the fact that their “operators and owners, 
historically speaking, ‘daily have the lives of thousands of helpless 
humans [sic] beings in their keeping.’”101 However, “off-duty” 
charter boat captains like Richard Smith are seemingly relieved of 
all criminal liability for deaths resulting from their negligence, while 
still being able to transport numerous passengers as long as they are 
not paying. As noted previously, in its Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal, the defense relied heavily on LaBrecque.102 Yet the vessel 
in LaBrecque was not a charter vessel, but purely a pleasure 
 
96 Id. (citing United States v. O’Keefe, 426 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2005)).  
97 Hilder & Creech, supra note 87, at 3.   
98 Abbate, supra note 1.  
99 Id.  
100 Jeanne M. Grasso, Law and Order: The Emergence of the Seaman’s 
Manslaughter Statute, 3 Benedict’s Maritime Bulletin, 170, 171 (2005). 
101 United States v. O’Keefe, 426 F.3d 274, 278, n. 1 (5th Cir. 2005). 
102 Def.’s Mot. at 6. 
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vessel.103 Therefore, while the victims in LaBrecque were 
nonpaying passengers assisting in the journey like those in Smith, 
the vessel in LaBrecque would never qualify as a commercial vessel 
for liability under section 1115. 
 
Based on the reasoning presented by Congress for the 
Seaman’s Manslaughter statutes, owners and operators of charter 
vessels not operating in their direct commercial capacity should still 
be subject to liability under section 1115. “Negligence occurs when 
there is a breach of duty, which is an omission to perform an act or 
to act in violation of a standard of care that is made to govern and 
control the manner of the discharge of a duty.”104 In the context of 
section 1115, the duty is shown by the vessel’s status as a 
commercial, rather than pleasure vessel, because “owners, 
operators, and inspectors of commercial vessels have [a] unique 
responsibility or fiduciary duty to those who are killed because of 
the misconduct or violations of standards of care.”105 When a charter 
vessel is carrying nonpaying passengers during a voyage from one 
place of operation to another – as Smith was doing – a vessel’s 
owner or an operator’s duty of care does not cease to exist. Not only 
can the voyage arguably be considered “commercial” in the general 
sense of the word, but charter boat owners and operators should be 
considered subject to criminal liability under section 1115 even 
when the vessel is not being directly operated in its commercial 
capacity for reasons of public policy. 
 
Therefore, while the Smith Court did reach the correct 
conclusion based on caselaw, section 1115 should be rewritten to 
include “off-duty” commercial vessels like the Cimarron in order to 
promote accountability for deaths resulting from negligence. 
 
While there is a compelling case to be made for expanding 
the application of section 1115 to charter and other vessels not 
directly operating in their commercial capacity, application of 
section 1115 to strictly pleasure vessels is unsupported by the 
 
103 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 437.  
104 Hilder & Creech, supra note 87, at 3. 
105 Id.  
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legislative intent.106 Furthermore, aside from the Hoopengarner 
case, there is no caselaw to support the application of section 1115 
to strictly pleasure vessels. Individuals who own and operate vessels 
strictly for pleasure are not subject to the “unique responsibilit[ies] 
and fiduciary dut[ies]” that their commercial counterparts are.107 
The unique circumstances of a charter boat captain like Smith, or a 
similarly situated operator of a commercial vessel, is that they are 
subject to those duties giving rise to liability under section 1115 at 
any point. 
 
The case for not extending criminal liability for negligence 
cannot be complete, however, without mentioning the number of 
fatalities that occur during the operation of pleasure vessels in the 
United States. According to the United States Coast Guard, there 
were a total of 2,480 accidents in 2017 resulting from operation of a 
vessel.108 There were 1,727 injuries as a result and 295 deaths.109 
The leading cause of fatalities in recreational boating is alcohol use 
by the operator, followed by “operator inexperience.”110 If section 
1115 were to be expanded to include pleasure vessels, there would 
be criminal liability under the lower negligence standard for the 
deaths of individuals resulting from causes such as operator 
inexperience. 
 
Although a seemingly attractive option to combat deaths 
resulting from the negligent operation of noncommercial pleasure 
vessels, the legislative intent does not support an expansion of 
section 1115 to impose liability for these deaths.111 Therefore, while 
Congress would possess the power to criminalize these offenses if 
they occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
 
106 See, Grasso, supra note 94, at 170; Fish, supra note 17, at 242-44; Hilder & 
Creech, supra note 87, at 1.  
107 O’Keefe, 426 F.3d at 278, n. 1; see also Hilder & Creech, supra note 87, at 3.  
 
108 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 
2017 Recreational Boating Statistics, 20 (2018), 
https://www.uscgboating.org/library/accident-statistics/Recreational-Boating-
Statistics-2017.pdf, [https://perma.cc/N3WQ-H2J4]. 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Grasso, supra note 94, at 170.  
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States,112 this legislation would not fit within the scope of section 




When Richard Smith embarked on his annual voyage from 
Camden, Maine to St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands, he was not engaged 
in commercial activity for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1115, 
otherwise known as Seaman’s Manslaughter. As a result, when 
David Pontious, who was not paying to be aboard the Cimarron, 
attacked Smith and then ultimately jumped overboard into the 
Atlantic Ocean, Smith was not subject to liability under section 
1115. Judge Curtis Gomez, relying on substantial caselaw, reached 
the correct conclusion in granting Smith’s Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal. 
 
While Judge Gomez reached the correct conclusion, Smith’s 
case presents an opportunity for Congress to clarify the scope of § 
1115 and to include “off-duty” commercial vessels, such as the 
Cimarron at the time of Pontious’ death. This minor expansion 
would fit within the original intent of Congress when it first enacted 
section 1115’s predecessor, while keeping the scope of the statute 
narrow enough to justify the lower mens rea. The application of § 
1115 derives from the higher duty of care that owners and operators 
of commercial vessels are subject to. For reasons of public policy, 
this duty should not be washed away simply because an individual 
was engaged in activity that was only tangentially related to 
commerce at a specific time. Although section 1115’s scope should 
be expanded to include “off-duty” commercial vessels, it should not 
include vessels that are strictly pleasure vessels with no commercial 





112 Fish, supra note 17, at 244, n. 17. 
